oday's common software maintenance processes originated when most systems were comprised of subroutines and procedures formatted in source code. Typical maintenance on such systems would include impact analysis, which determines if and how different system parts interact, and regression testing, which uses test code inputs from earlier versions to ensure system integrity after maintenance. For such systems, impact analysis was often sufficient to determine whether maintenance in one procedure would affect another procedure and could thus be used to limit retesting to relevant procedures. However, these traditional maintenance procedures-which rely on source code visibility-are insufficient to contend with the maintenance demands of component-based development.
maintenance becomes much harder because source code is either partially or completely invisible. For example, most applications built for Windows NT use Microsoft's Foundation Classes. When you build a Windows NT application, you have effectively teamed with hundreds of Microsoft's developers. However, when the application needs maintenance, you become a one-person team.
Clearly, component-based development forces us to rethink our maintenance technologies. If we are component vendors, for example, we must think not just of maintaining a block of source code in a specific application, but of maintaining code that is reused in numerous customer applications. Because each application may have slightly different requirements, component modifications may not work for all applications.
If we are component integrators, we must think in terms of technologies that will let us maintain the entire system. If the components are "black boxes," visibility is limited to documentation that describes the component's operation and functionality. Although maintaining unfamiliar code is a common maintenance dilemma, maintaining systems filled with black boxes adds a new level of difficulty.
As we continue to move toward OO languages and component-based software engineering, software development will become less creative and more like traditional manufacturing. Software developers'principle tasks will shift from coding to designing and integrating. Component-based development will also decrease the importance of development-based maturity models and increase the need for acquisition-based models. It also promises to reduce time-to-market and offer consumers more choice and lower costs. However, to reap these benefits, we must meet several software maintenance challenges.
COTS SOFTWARE
Maintaining systems that incorporate COTS components can be a nightmare for several reasons, including ♦ frozen functionality; ♦ incompatible upgrades (such as added features or bug fixes that, while independently reliable, are incompatible with the host system), ♦ Trojan horses; ♦ defective or unreliable COTS software; and ♦ complex or defective middleware (such as wrappers), which brokers information between COTS and custom software.
Frozen functionality
Frozen functionality occurs when a component's vendor either goes out of business or stops supporting the component. Applications with frozen components can become unmaintainable. If components require periodic updates, for example, the system developer has a serious problem, such as with a parser component that requires modifications each time the language changes.
There is no easy solution to frozen functionality. 1 However, you do have options. You can ♦ try to implement that functionality yourself, ♦ acquire the functionality elsewhere, or ♦ acquire the source code from the current vendor and maintain it yourself. Unless you have the required domain expertise, the first option is probably implausible. The second option will work only if competing components have the functionality you need. If there are no alternatives and writing the functionality from scratch is unrealistic, the third alternative is the only option. To ensure you can exercise this option, you should negotiate for source code rights in the licensing agreement. However, if your maintenance personnel do not have the domain expertise to maintain the unfamiliar code, the results can be disastrous. Hiring the people who wrote the code as consultants is a workaround, but the costs can be prohibitive.
Incompatible upgrades
Software vendors upgrade and maintain components according to the needs of their biggest existing and potential customers. If the changes or fixes you need do not align with what fellow customers demand, a component you rely on may one day become incompatible with the rest of your system.
The incompatibility problem is similar to the frozen-functionality issue: Do you abandon the vendor's component and build your own, or look to competitors for options? Assuming that it is infeasible to build your own replacement, acquire it elsewhere, or modify your software, you do have another option: building a wrapper around a component to keep it from exhibiting incompatible behaviors. However, wrapping alone may not be effective if component upgrades cause incompatibilities in how a system hooks to the upgraded components. In this case, you may also have to rewrite the "glue" that connects these components to the rest of the system. If wrappers or modifications to the "glue" do not solve the upgrade problem, downgrading-sometimes referred to as uninstalling-may be necessary. Uninstalling can be difficult, as it is not always easy to reverse the steps taken during an upgrade. Nevertheless, like uninstalling an OS or application, uninstalling components is destined to become a common maintenance activity. Automated "component downgrading"tools will be needed. Still, 100 percent automation may be impossible. In Year 2000 conversion tools, even the best automated tools fix only 90 to 98 percent of the needed conversions. The rest are handled manually.
Interestingly, the need for downgrading would disappear if we could determine a priori an upgrade's compatibility. Although this is difficult, there are several dynamic approaches for certifying the compatibility of COTS components in a given system. 2 The fear of incompatible upgrades is well founded. Except for the relatively rare upgrades in which bugs are truly fixed without compromising code in the process, upgrades require you to swap out "tried and tested" functionality with unproven functionality. The moral of the story? Be ready to downgrade when incompatibilities occur.
Trojan horses
In software, a Trojan horse is a component that has been covertly and intentionally programmed for malicious behavior. For example, a Trojan horse component that is supposed to delete only files in a fixed directory might switch to a privileged directory and delete all files.
Attempting to locate a Trojan horse staticallyeither by reading it or putting it through a parseris difficult as it sacrifices the code's context. The best way to hide a Trojan horse is to make it dynamically context sensitive. For example, a "delete all files" command may be perfectly legal if it refers to files in a temporary directory. However, the same command could have terrible consequences if it changes its context to a system directory and removes system files. If the directory to which the delete is applied can only be determined at runtime, static identification methods will provide little help.
When you swap in components, avoiding those with malicious behavior is virtually impossible. Detecting them is also problematic: it is difficult enough to identify malicious behavior when you have source code access; without it, it is nearly impossible. Although relying on known and reputable vendors can provide some protection, it is not a guarantee. In 1994, for example, Adobe released Photoshop 3.0-forgetting to remove a "time bomb" that automatically shut the program down. The time bomb was an overlooked remnant of the beta test cycle. 3 Detecting a component's malicious behavior requires that you monitor all requests from the component to the operating system and check each request's context. You can use a wrapper to do this, but not with total confidence; the process typically involves numerous calls and context checks, and the wrapper is likely to produce false-positives (filtering out requests it should not) as well as permit requests that should be denied.
Unreliable components
The problems of incompatible upgrades and unreliable COTS components are distinct, but related. Today, no uniform standards exist by which software components are tested and certified for reliability. There are process measurement schemes-such as the Capability Maturity Model, ISO, and so on-but good processes do not guarantee good software 4 (and, even if they did, COTS vendors can lie about process maturity).
Software reliability models have been proposed for years, 5 but the assumptions they often make about such things as environment, defect rates, defect severities, and fault sizes are generic and may not reflect the idiosyncrasies of different environments. Thus, even if a vendor supplies a dependability score, for example, that score may be based on factors irrelevant to your environment.
If maintenance is to someday become a process of swapping components in and out, we must have a universal standard to assess component dependability. Such an approach must provide enough information to account for environmental variability. We have standard ways to assess transistor quality, and we price them accordingly. Why not the same for software components? Knowing how a component affects system behavior before we use it would certainly make component-based maintenance less of a gamble.
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The moral of the story? Be ready to downgrade when incompatibilities occur.
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Wrappers
Middleware is a general term for software that joins together, mediates between, or enhances two separate software packages. Middleware is designed to monitor and (if necessary) modify how components interact. Whenever you are unsure about how a component will interact with other system parts, you should write middleware to enforce certain behaviors.
A
Wrapping technology has roots in the safety-critical community, which has long used techniques to partition off safety-critical functions. Wrappers typically work by restricting a component's input or output information, both of which alter component functionality.
The problem with wrappers is in knowing which behaviors to protect against. If you don't know how a component will behave, it's difficult to protect yourself against its behavior. Querying the vendor could shake loose some information, but the best approach is to extensively test the component in the system environment. By combining vendor information requests and in-house testing, you can create more thorough wrappers.
Wrappers are a reasonable way to address incompatibility, Trojan horses, and dependability problems. But wrappers are not foolproof. They can be complex, incomplete, and unreliable, particularly if you are unsure about what behaviors you are protecting yourself against.
THIRD-PARTY, NONCOMMERCIAL SOFTWARE
Third-party components include shareware, freeware, public-domain, and "copyleft" software. Shareware is typically free evaluation software that you can download from the Internet. An example here is Nico Mak Computing's WinZip. Downloading shareware usually implies a tacit agreement: If you like the software and want to keep using it, you'll send the vendor a nominal distribution fee. If you do not register and pay the fee, shareware usually times out.
As with COTS, some shareware vendors are highly reliable and exercise tight control on software integrity. But given the nature of distribution, the source of shareware is not always clear. For example, in 1995, a program that appeared to be the 3.0 beta release of PKZIP, a DOS compression utility, was widely circulated on the Internet. When users ran the program, it erased their hard disk. 3 Because source code is not typically distributed with shareware, using it raises the same COTSrelated maintenance problems. This is also true with freeware, which is similar to shareware except that there is no registration fee. Freeware is usually distributed in executable format only. An example of freeware is Dunce, a Win95 dialer add-on.
Public-domain software is freely distributed in source code format with no usage restrictions; it can be modified at will. For example, Sun Microsystems used BSD Unix (public domain) to build their proprietary OSs. Maintaining public-domain software or using it in products raises the same problems as maintaining source code from a vendor that withdraws support.
The GNU project's copyleft is public-domain software in slightly different form. A typical copyright notice takes away a person's freedom to change or redistribute software; the GNU project's copyleft is a licensing scheme that says, conversely, that "anyone who redistributes the software, with or without changes, must pass along the freedom to further copy and change it." To make this work, GNU copyrights the software and then adds legally binding distribution terms that give everyone the right to use, modify, and redistribute the program's code, or any program derived from it, if the distribution terms are unchanged. By doing so, the code and the freedoms become legally inseparable. In terms of maintenance, copyleft software suffers from those problems associated with maintaining unfamiliar source code.
Maintenance options for third-party software often depend on licensing restrictions. If the software is delivered in executable format, the COTS problems apply. If source code is provided, domain expertise issues can arise.
If you don't know how a component will behave, it's difficult to protect yourself against its behavior.
IN-HOUSE COMPONENT REPOSITORIES
In-house components are those stored in proprietary reuse repositories (libraries). Two types of in-house code must be maintained: source code for components used in one system, and source code for components in a reusable library. The latter can affect systems across the organization.
Repository architecture
A component repository's architecture can affect the maintenance process for all systems that incorporate repository components. Functionally structured repositories are more difficult to maintain because they are organized around information types. As a result, applications might be coupled to everything in the repository and not just a particular component's information. For example, assume that we have three components X, Y, and Z, each of which stores the following types of information: analysis, design, source code, and test. A functionally structured repository would be organized as follows:
source: X Y Z analysis: X Y Z design: X Y Z test: X Y Z Here, extracting one of the components-X, Y, or Z-during maintenance is difficult; to do so requires that you extract the source, design, analysis, and test information for all components and then extract from this data the desired information on a specific component. This demands massive amounts of storage and renders the approach impractical.
In contrast, an information class repository's structure is organized as follows :
X: analysis design source test Y: analysis design source test Z: analysis design source test This architecture lets you extract individual component information and more easily maintain all components.
Maintenance challenges
Maintaining an in-house library is difficult: you must ensure that component modifications are compatible with all applications using that component. Reusing a component in multiple applications often constrains the component to a common set of specifications that must be met if reuse is to succeed. The downside to this is that some such components might become so generic over time that certain applications could no longer use them.
To meet the demands of in-house reuse, most software repositories employ different access rules. By adding logistical rules about component modifications, software repositories can better organize software development and maintenance teams. However, developing software according to repository access rules can stifle developer creativity, as developers must check out source code prior to modifying it and test the changes prior to reintegrating it into the library. In addition, when developers check out components, those components are exclusively locked until they are returned. File locking can thus compromise the maintenance of other applications that use the locked components.
However burdensome these steps, if file locking is not used, other problems arise. For example, a developer may so substantially change a component that merging those changes with anyone else's changes becomes a nightmare. Without revision control, the component maintenance process will bring more disaster than benefit to your application development process.
A different approach to maintaining reusable components is "promotion." Promotion has three levels oriented to all applications:
♦ development/maintenance, ♦ test, and ♦ release.
With the promotion repository architecture, developers check out component source code from the development/maintenance level, make changes, and commit the changes to their own personal repositories. When they are confident that the changes are correct, they promote their code to the development/maintenance level where a manager integrates the changes and promotes it to the test level. At the same time, developers can still check out component source code from the development/maintenance level and make additional modifications. After testing approves the changes, the development manager will promote the software to the release level, where it is made available for general use. A repository's architecture and componentrevision control are vital to successfully maintaining systems built from in-house components. You also need solid testing, documentation, and traceability to a component's specification. C omponent-based software development is founded on the divide-and-conquer principle: larger system needs are broken down and satisfied by individual subsystems. Success depends on software units that were developed elsewhere, which requires that we rethink and upgrade traditional software maintenance solutions.
The best advice? ♦ Avoid building mini-systems from components. ♦ Keep detailed requirements documentation on each component, and avoid the temptation to keep endlessly adding "bells and whistles." ♦ Use an information class repository structure and promotion. ♦ If competing applications share a component but cannot tolerate changes the other might need, keep two similar components in the repository. It is better to have two unique components and two working applications than a single componentand only one application that works. In the future, software maintenance may be as simple as swapping components in and out. But, as we learned from the Ariane 5 disaster, even reusing components in similar environments may not be safe, 6 particularly when detailed integration testing 2 is not part of routine maintenance.
Using component-based software engineering, we might someday rapidly produce information systems. However, such component-based systems are much harder to certify and validate than their predecessors. If this issue is not adequately addressed, these systems might be unmaintainable, since legacy systems require frequent regression testing. Still, cars, airplanes, and buildings are maintained via replacement parts and have overcome many of the challenges we now face. Why not software? y
